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I. INTRODUCTION+ 
A. Assumptions of a Spectrum Crunch 
It is now taken almost as a matter of faith among telecommunications pro-
fessionals that there is a “spectrum crunch”1 precipitated by ever-growing de-
mand for mobile broadband.2 This, in turn, has driven a strong policy consen-
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 1 See, e.g., Spectrum Crunch, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/spectrum-crunch 
(last visited May 05, 2015). 
 2 This paper uses “mobile broadband” to refer to wireless data access over facilities-
based mobile network operator (MNO) infrastructure. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, ANNU-
AL REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO MOBILE 
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sus among industry and policymakers for the U.S. federal government to ac-
tively make available to mobile network operators (MNOs) vast new swathes 
of spectral resources via exclusive-use licenses.3 In the National Broadband 
Plan, for example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) argued 
that “[t]he growth of wireless broadband will be constrained if government 
does not make spectrum available to enable network expansion and technology 
upgrades.”4 The White House has taken up this cause as well, issuing a memo-
randum calling for 500 MHz of new spectrum to be made available for mobile 
and wireless broadband by 20205 and making new spectrum resources central 
to policies supporting “everything from smart phones to wireless broadband 
connectivity for laptops to new forms of machine-to-machine communication 
within a decade.”6 Similar efforts to free up spectrum for mobile broadband are 
taking place across the globe.7 
It is indisputable that mobile connectivity, driven by new technological de-
velopments in materials, miniaturization, and computing, has increased dra-
matically around the world and radically transformed economic and social 
life.8 Both mobile subscriptions and the amount of data traversing mobile net-
works has increased substantially in the past several years; by the end of 2014, 
                                                                                                             
WIRELESS, INCLUDING COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES 39, 42 (2013), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-13-34A1.pdf. 
 3 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND 
PLAN xii (2010), available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-
plan.pdf. 
 4 See id. at 77. 
 5 See The White House, Memorandum from the White House on Unleashing the Wire-
less Broadband Revolution, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-
unleashing-wireless-broadband-revolution. These are based on FCC recommendations. Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n, supra note 3, at 84. 
 6 Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Details Plan to Win the Future through 
Expanded Wireless Access, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/10/president-obama-details-plan-win-
future-through-expanded-wireless-access. 
 7 See Frank Swain, Will We Ever... Face a Wireless ‘Spectrum Crunch’?, BBC (Oct. 
15, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20131014-are-we-headed-for-wireless-chaos 
(noting that “[m]any governments, then, are looking for ways to alleviate the [spectrum 
crunch] problem before the wireless signal to our electronic devices starts failing. So far, the 
principle strategy has been to find more spectrum”). 
 8 See DELOITTE, WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF MOBILE TELEPHONY ON ECONOMIC GROWTH? A 
REPORT FOR THE GSM ASSOCIATION 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/gsma-deloitte-impact-
mobile-telephony-economic-growth.pdf; MANUEL CASTELLS ET AL., THE MOBILE COMMUNI-
CATION SOCIETY: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE ON THE SOCIAL USES 
OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 238-249 (2004), available at 
http://hack.tion.free.fr/textes/MobileCommunicationSociety.pdf. 
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there were an estimated 2.3 billion mobile broadband subscriptions globally, 
almost five times as many as in 2008.9 
At the same time, decisions about spectrum should not and cannot be made 
lightly due to the physically limited nature of spectrum and the corresponding 
strong public interest in efficient spectrum allocation.10 Regulators must con-
sider social, equity, public safety, environmental, and other factors in addition 
to economic impacts when determining whether and how to repurpose spec-
trum. Furthermore, freeing up “new” spectrum is only one of several mecha-
nisms for dealing with increasing mobile demand, and exclusive-use licenses 
are one among many different management options for spectrum bands.11 Alt-
hough conventional spectrum wisdom highlights making new exclusive-use 
allocations available to MNOs, this may not be the most efficient or socially 
beneficial decision in all cases. It is exactly these kinds of concerns that led to 
calls in the National Broadband Plan for the U.S. government to make spec-
trum allocation and licensing data more accessible, as the “complexity of the 
[existing] system and the resulting lack of transparency and usability create 
impediments to public policy and limit the emergence of new technologies that 
could employ such data to optimize use of the spectrum automatically.”12 
In this paper, we examine the provenance, reliability, and uses of mobile 
demand forecasts and find that several highly visible spectrum demand esti-
mates over the past several years have exceeded actual traffic, which may have 
biased spectrum allocation decisions and policies in socially suboptimal 
ways.13 These reports include Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI) esti-
                                                
 9 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, THE WORLD IN 2014: ICT FACTS AND FIGURES (2014), 
available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2014-
e.pdf (charting growth from 2007 to 2014 of mobile broadband and all mobile subscriptions, 
respectively). 
 10 See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (noting “certain basic 
facts about radio as a means of communication—its facilities are limited; they are not avail-
able to all who may wish to use them; the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to ac-
commodate everybody”). 
 11 See Jon M. Peha, Sharing Spectrum Through Spectrum Policy Reform and Cognitive 
Radio, 97 Proc. of the IEEE 708, 710-16 (2009); Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Spectrum Policy 
Task Force, Report of the Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities Working Group 2 (2002) 
available at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:3Vmxfxyxo4wJ:www.fcc.gov/sptf/
files/SRRWGFinalReport.doc+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (describing alternative mod-
els). 
 12 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, supra note 3, at 80. 
 13 George S. Ford correctly points out that data “demand,” in its economic sense, is 
difficult or impossible to measure directly and will always be higher than actual traffic due 
to carrier adjustments in the face of spectral congestion, including changes in pricing or 
technology. See George S. Ford, Have We Got it All Wrong? Forecasting Mobile Data Use 
and Spectrum Exhaust, PHOENIX CENTER FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL’Y STUD. 
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mates,14 which are commonly cited in government and industry reports, includ-
ing the National Broadband Plan, as well as estimates endorsed in ITU’s 
WRC-07. We explore potential technological, economic, and sociological fac-
tors that may drive these biases, as well as possible solutions and policy reme-
dies. This paper is not meant to imply any deliberate misrepresentation from 
any party, although this is certainly possible when billions of dollars are at 
stake, as with spectrum policy. Rather, the paper investigates various potential 
sources of bias and methods to mitigate such risks, in the hopes that it might 
inform businesses, regulators, and the general public about how to better allo-
cate and manage finite spectrum resources. 
Neither does this analysis imply that making any new, exclusive-use availa-
ble for mobile broadband is the suboptimal policy decision. In the near future, 
such reallocations provide benefits to both MNOs and the general public 
through deficit reduction and economic multipliers.15 Rather, it suggests addi-
tional caution and scrutiny are warranted for long-term spectrum policy deci-
sions, rather than a blind faith about ever-increasing mobile data demand. In 
these cases, especially, policymakers should push for new, higher quality data 
before committing to long-term policies as well as favor flexibility and revers-
ibility in their decision-making. 
B. The Importance of Data Provenance in Policy: Lessons from Intellectual 
Property Debates 
The issue of unreliable data taking “a life of its own” is not just a theoretical 
one.16 The history of intellectual property policy in the United States provides 
one telling example of how data with uncertain provenance can become well-
                                                                                                             
2 (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.phoenix-center.org/perspectives/Perspective14-06Final.pdf. 
As argued in greater detail later, in this paper we typically interpret mobile demand fore-
casts as forecasts of actual data traffic, since these forecasts typically incorporate supply-
side and pricing adjustments into their calculations. 
 14 See CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORE-
CAST UPDATE 2014-2019 (2015), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-
vni/white_paper_c11-520862.pdf. 
 15 Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Doubling the Amount of Commercial Spectrum 
to Unleash the Innovative Potential of Wireless Broadband, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 28, 
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-doubling-amount-
commercial-spectrum-unleash-innovative-potential-wireless. 
 16 See, e.g., Julian Sanchez, 750,000 Lost Jobs? The Dodgy Digits Behind the War in 
Piracy, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 8, 2008, 11:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2008/10/dodgy-digits-behind-the-war-on-piracy (describing the misrepresentation of 
job numbers lost to piracy stemming from unreliable data). 
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established, and then exert an influence on policy.17 In particular, for much of 
the prior decade, advocates of strong IP protections emphasized data claiming 
that 750,000 U.S. jobs have been lost to IP theft and that IP infringement cost 
the U.S. economy $200 to $250 billion each year.18 These figures were then 
routinely cited by the U.S. Customs & Border Patrol (CPB), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and Federal Trade Commission (FTC),19 even though in-
vestigative analysis revealed that there was “no good reason to think that either 
[figure] is remotely reliable.”20 Yet such figures, bolstered in part by industry 
groups that had a vested financial interest in claiming significant losses, be-
came a primary input into calls for legislation strengthening intellectual prop-
erty rights.21 Although it is impossible to precisely trace the impact of these 
figures on the strong IP protections passed or proposed in recent years, the 
numbers were repeatedly cited in IP policy debates, including, for example, 
around the PRO-IP Act,22 which was passed in 2008.23 
The history of these numbers provides four important lessons regarding the 
origin and use of empirical analysis in policy debates. First, a source that is 
unreliable or only partially addresses a specific issue can become a “reliable” 
fact if it is repeated enough and its origin becomes obfuscated.24 More precise-
ly, over time, such data gain reliability when qualifiers and nuance that accom-
panied the original reports are dropped, as well as by association with large, 
well-known organizations that lend the figures their institutional credibility.25 
For example, the 750,000 job-loss figure was originally the upper end of a 
broad estimate, but over time that range, and even the “up to,” qualifier, disap-
peared.26 Both figures were commonly referenced by industry and government 
sources in part because of their use by credible government agencies.27 Second, 
industry groups and associations, to the extent that skewed numbers might 
provide financial gains or policy leverage, can assist this process by repeating 
                                                
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 U.S.  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO 
QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 19 (2010). 
 20 Sanchez, supra note 16. 
 21 Id. 
 22 H.R. 4279, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 23 Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 425 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 
18 U.S.C.). 
 24 See Sanchez, supra note 16 (describing several sources for a jobs figure that was 
repeated over a series of years). 
 25 See id. (stating that the jobs figure was repeated by the United States Customs and 
Border Patrol). 
 26 Id. 
 27 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 18. 
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the numbers or obscuring their origin.28 Third, the government is willing to use 
data with unclear provenance in policy decisions, in part due to the ways in 
which unreliability becomes obscured over time.29 And finally, once a figure 
becomes established, it can persist for a long time; the 750,000 figure traced 
back nearly a quarter-century30 before some government sources stopped rely-
ing on it, and even then “[t]hese estimates attributed to FBI, CBP, and FTC 
continue to be referenced by various industry and government sources as evi-
dence of the significance of the counterfeiting and piracy problem to the U.S. 
economy.”31 
The IP debate is not, nor is intended to serve, as a perfect analogy to spec-
trum demand forecasts. In the case of IP, estimates revolved around economic 
costs, not future demand.32 Moreover, wireless demand figures are regularly 
and reliably updated, and there are a greater number of forecasters.33 However, 
the underlying dynamics surrounding how data provenance can be obscured in 
policy debates contain several similarities, and we find evidence of all four of 
these factors in spectrum policy. 
C. Spectrum Forecasts Have Been Important Determinants of National Policy 
Like IP policy, in the U.S., outside data with unclear reliability have been 
key inputs into national spectrum policies. In the U.S., for example, spectrum 
forecasts are routinely cited in national policy decisions about the allocation of 
wireless frequencies.34 Former Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski has 
referenced Cisco projections in justifying clearing 500 MHz of spectrum and 
                                                
 28 See Sanchez, supra note 16 (citing both the FBI and International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition as organizations that quote the figure). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19. 
 32 See Sanchez, supra note 16. 
 33 See, e.g., CISCO, supra note 14, at 1 (“Global mobile data grew 69 percent in 2014.”); 
see also ERICSSON, ERICSSON MOBILITY REPORT 3 (2014), available at 
http://www.ericsson.com/res/docs/2014/ericsson-mobility-report-november-2014.pdf (stat-
ing that “60 percent growth in mobile data traffic” for the year between Q3 2013 and Q3 
2014). 
 34 See In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Rules with Regard to Commer-
cial Operations in the 1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, and 2155-2180 MHz Bands, Re-
port and Order, GN Docket No. 13-185, 29 FCC Rcd 4610, para. 3 (Mar. 31, 2014) (“The 
demand for spectrum…is expected to continue increasing” and the FCC is continuing to 
“make available additional licensed and unlicensed spectrum to meet this growing de-
mand”); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC STAFF TECHNICAL PAPER: MOBILE BROADBAND: 
THE BENEFITS OF ADDITIONAL SPECTRUM 9 Exhibit 4 (2010), available at 
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/fcc-staff-technical-paper-mobile-broadband-benefits-
of-additional-spectrum.pdf; FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 84. 
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warned that “we should remember that the clock won’t stop in 2020, and data 
demand will continue to increase.”35 As recently as August 1, 2014, FCC ex-
perts emphasized that “[c]onsumer demand is exploding, data usage is growing 
exponentially, and faster 4G networks enable even more data services.”36 
MNOs, citing increasing demand for their services, have with great success 
argued that they need additional spectrum to expand and improve their net-
works; for example, CTIA cites both Cisco and ITU in arguing that without 
additional spectrum, the wireless industry will face a “crisis.”37 
Regulators face complex decisions in how to manage and allocate spectrum 
bands. Economists argue that the overall value to society through increased 
economic efficiency brought by new communication services is several multi-
ples of the value to the spectrum license holder, as reflected in their bids for 
exclusive-use licenses.38 However, in some cases, shared spectrum manage-
ment plans facilitate device and application innovation that can also generate 
significant social and economic value.  This may be the case even when access 
rights are open to all qualified users and are not auctioned.39 The most notable 
example is the 2.4 GHz ISM band that supports significant Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 
and other unlicensed uses. For certain applications—including certain types of 
intensive wireless data transmission—such unlicensed bands can be signifi-
cantly more efficient means for wireless data transfer than potential alterna-
tives.40 Moreover, additional social benefits to using spectrum, such as im-
provements to public safety, quality of life, and national defense, are difficult 
                                                
 35 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Winning the Global Race: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Mobile Broadband, Address at the University of Pennsyl-
vania – Wharton (Oct. 4, 2012), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-316661A1.pdf. 
 36 Roger C. Sherman, Empowering Small Businesses, OFFICIAL FCC BLOG (Aug. 1, 
2014, 10:01 AM), https://www.fcc.gov/blog/empowering-small-businesses. 
 37 John Marinho, It is No Trick – There is a Spectrum Crisis, CTIA – THE WIRELESS 
ASS’N BLOG (Oct. 23, 2012), http://blog.ctia.org/2012/10/23/it-is-no-trick-there-is-a-
spectrum-crisis. 
 38 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Munoz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum 
Allocation Policies 2 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 06-28, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908717 (arguing that total social 
welfare benefits produced in public spectrum auctions are dominant over auction revenues). 
 39 See PAUL MILGROM, JONATHAN LEVIN & ASSAD EILAT, THE CASE FOR UNLICENSED 
SPECTRUM 16-19, ¶¶ 42-49 (2011), available at 
http://siepr.stanford.edu/?q=/system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/10036_Paper_Milgrom.pd
f (estimating that Wi-Fi creates $25 billion in the economic value of mobile data traffic, $12 
billion in the economic value of mobile data speed, and a possible $15 billion in the eco-
nomic value of Wi-Fi only peripherals). 
 40 See id. at 9, ¶ 24 (2011) (noting that unlicensed Wi-Fi spectrum allows “devices to 
make intensive use of spectrum by reusing spectrum many times, but compared to cellular 
networks, its much smaller transmission radius allows much more reuse”). 
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to quantify or allocate using market demand-based methods and require regula-
tors to make value judgments about the importance of various services.41 To 
accommodate and balance these various sources of demand, regulators rely on 
projections of the future types and intensity of wireless usage, among other 
inputs.42 
For these reasons, when spectrum demand forecasts are inaccurate, govern-
ments may make suboptimal policy decisions. Overestimating the growth of 
mobile network traffic and focusing on exclusive-use licenses, for example, 
can crowd out other types of wireless communication by increasing spectrum 
scarcity.43 This directly hinders wireless innovation by raising the entry costs 
for new applications or services that require spectrum access.44 Thus, commu-
nications services that might offer greater overall social benefit—by, for ex-
ample, offering cheaper service at reduced, but acceptable, quality of service—
may be shortchanged.45 Due to the ubiquitous nature of wireless communica-
tion, this effect may be felt throughout the economy as well as in a range of 
government activities, from law enforcement to defense.46 
                                                
 41 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 4 
(discussing several important services that market-based methods might disrupt). 
 42 See, e.g., Report and Order, supra note 34 (“The demand for spectrum…is expected 
to continue increasing” and the FCC is continuing to “make available additional licensed 
and unlicensed spectrum to meet this growing demand”); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra 
note 34, at 9, Exhibit 4; FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 84; REAL WIRELESS, 
STUDY ON THE FUTURE UK SPECTRUM DEMAND FOR TERRESTRIAL MOBILE BROADBAND AP-
PLICATIONS i, iii (2014), available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/cfi-mobile-
bb/annexes/RW_report.pdf. 
 43 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 7. 
 44 See MARTIN COOPER, THE MYTH OF SPECTRUM SCARCITY: WHY SHUFFLING EXISTING 
SPECTRUM AMONG USERS WILL NOT SOLVE AMERICA’S WIRELESS BROADBAND CHALLENGE 
5 (2010), available at http://dynallc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/themythofspectrumscarcity.pdf; cf. JOHN M. CHAPIN & WILLIAM H. 
LEHR, MASS. INST. OF TECH., MOBILE BROADBAND GROWTH, SPECTRUM SCARCITY AND SUS-
TAINABLE COMPETITION 22 (2011), available at http://people.csail.mit.edu/wlehr/Lehr-
Papers_files/chapin_lehr_tprc2011%20mobile%20broadband.pdf (noting that dedicated 
unlicensed spectrum supports competition and innovation in new applications and services). 
 45 See CHAPIN & LEHR, supra note 44, at 5-6 (noting that when facilities-based operators 
lack additional spectrum, they must resort to cell-splitting at higher infrastructure costs per 
square kilometer; this leads to a concentrated market where most firms will “either exit the 
market or be reduced to niche competitors that offer lower-quality discount services”). 
 46 See Jessica Rosenworcel, A Federal Wireless Policy Built on Carrots, Not Sticks, THE 
HILL CONGRESS BLOG (June 17, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/technology/308011-a-federal-wireless-policy-built-on-carrots-not-sticks. 
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D. Demand Forecasts Affect Network and Capital Investment 
Like regulators, those investing in wireless services also use spectrum de-
mand estimates to make long-lasting decisions about billions of dollars of capi-
tal.47 Wireless operators, for example, have several means of dealing with in-
creasing demand in addition to obtaining new spectrum. These include splitting 
cell sites or increasing deployment of small cells (densification),48 upgrading to 
LTE or other more efficient technologies (including refarming of spectrum 
bands dedicated to less efficient transmission technologies),49 improving of-
floading techniques,50  or using financial incentives to adjust customer de-
mand.51 However, when national regulators emphasize clearing new spectrum, 
investing in new spectrum licenses is more likely to become the most econom-
ical means for managing demand, and MNOs are therefore less likely to invest 
in physical infrastructure even when this might be the most socially beneficial 
outcome.52 
Demand estimates also drive outside investment decisions. When future es-
timates of wireless demand are high, investors are more likely to invest in such 
businesses, typically at the expense of investing in other areas of the economy 
or into different technologies.53 Demand estimates that are not accurate can 
therefore hurt the efficient allocation of the larger economy by incentivizing 
                                                
 47 See Thomas Gryta, A Gold Rush Hits Wireless Spectrum, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2013, 
7:51 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579248041603159658 (noting 
that Verizon Wireless purchased $3.9 billion of spectrum, and AT&T purchased a rival for 
$1.2 billion “largely to take over its rights to use the airwaves” in order to keep up with the 
demand for spectrum); BROAD. CABLE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, UNDERSTANDING BROADCAST 
AND CABLE FINANCE 29 (2013) (noting that FCC licenses are generally treated as indefinite-
ly lived intangible assets). 
 48 10 Ways to Deal with Mobile Data Capacity Crunch, AMDOCS 3, 
http://www.amdocs.com/Whitepapers/OSS/WhitePaper-MobileDataCapacityCrunch.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 07, 2015) (noting that service providers can spatially separate the trans-
missions from each cell site, install additional carriers per cell site, or roll out additional 
macro cell sites to deal with the mobile data capacity crunch). 
 49 Dan Hays et al., Solving the Spectrum Crunch: Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, 18 COMM. 
REV. 12, 19 (2013). 
 50 See 10 Ways to Deal with Mobile Data Capacity Crunch, supra note 48, at  4-5 (not-
ing that “dramatic capacity increase” can be made by offloading mobile data to Wi-Fi and 
femtocells). 
 51 See DAN HAYS ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THREE WAYS MOBILE OPERATORS 
CAN (PROFITABLY) HELP CUSTOMERS SELF-MANAGE DATA CONSUMPTION (2013), available 
at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/industry/communications/publications/assets/pwc-
mobile-operators-help-customers-self-manage-data.pdf; Ford, supra note 13, at 4. 
 52 See FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 7 (noting that additional spectrum is 
an economic substitute for additional network investment). 
 53 See Hays et al., supra note 49, at 14. 
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over- or under-investment in communications-related enterprises vis-à-vis oth-
er areas of the economy. Overestimates may also cause investors to overpay 
for wireless assets.54 As this over-allocation becomes apparent, prices typically 
drop and the industry must downsize or correct.55 This creates unnecessary vol-
atility and may drive away future investments.56 For example, “wildly optimis-
tic” predictions in the 1990s that Internet traffic was doubling every three 
months57—driven in part by “false” Internet traffic reports from Worldcom58—
led to overinvestment in fiber optic capacity and the subsequent bankruptcy of 
many wireline infrastructure companies. As with IP figures, the Worldcom 
reports were routinely cited by government officials and business reporters 
despite “a lack of hard data” to substantiate them, being lent an “air of credibil-
ity” due to the proprietary nature of Internet traffic volumes and Worldcom’s 
unique position at the time to monitor such information.59 
E. Spectrum Forecasts Should Have a High Burden of Proof 
In general, getting spectrum policy right is even more important than pure 
economic factors would indicate, for at least four major reasons. First, unlike 
most other resources, the electromagnetic spectrum, by its very nature, is a 
physically limited resource; no new frequencies can ever be created or de-
stroyed. 60 In general, this means that once spectrum is allocated to one set of 
                                                
 54 See id. (noting how mobile-data use has become “indoor and nomadic – after many 
operators have invested steeply in outdoor coverage, capacity, and poorly propagating spec-
trum”). 
 55 Once the industry realizes the spectrum has been over-allocated, demand will drop, 
and the law of demand states that prices will also drop. See David R. Henderson, Demand, 
in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. (2008), available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Demand.html. 
 56 Cf. Ian Huntsley, Investment Strategies for Volatile Markets, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/08/strategies-for-volatile-market.asp (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2015) (noting that as volatility rises, investors face a rise in risk of loss, 
therefore driving away investors). 
 57 Yochi J. Dreazen, Wildly Optimistic Data Drove Telecoms to Build Fiber Glut, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2002, 3:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1032982764442483713. 
 58 J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the 
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 228 
(2003). 
 59 Id.; ANDREW ODLYZKO, AT&T LABS RESEARCH, INTERNET GROWTH: MYTH, REALITY, 
AND ABUSE, available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/internet.growth.myth.pdf. 
 60 Historically, in the long-run, technology improvements have greatly increased the 
range of usable frequencies for wireless communication. See Kevin Werbach & Aalok Me-
hta, The Spectrum Opportunity: Sharing as the Solution to the Wireless Crunch, 8 INT’L J. 
COMM. 133, 140 (2014). However, we do not consider such frequency expansions in this 
paper since the timing of such improvements is uncertain and is generally beyond the plan-
ning range of most business and policy decisions. See, e.g., Dan Hays et al., supra note 49, 
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users, it is not available for alternative applications or technologies.61 This fi-
nite nature of spectrum allocation, in fact, drives much of modern communica-
tions policy.62 
This aspect of spectrum also strongly distinguishes wireless industries from 
their wireline counterparts.63 In wireline industries, expansion of, say, fiber-
optic backbones—even when this requires access to public resources such as 
rights-of-way—does not generally crowd out the ability of competing compa-
nies or applications to deploy their own infrastructure.64 Thus, both the Com-
mission and courts have acknowledged the existence and importance of a “vir-
tuous cycle of innovation” for wireline broadband, in which excess bandwidth 
drives novel application development, which in turn pushes additional network 
expansion.65 Such dynamism is problematic in wireless industries, where over-
investment may stifle, rather than encourage, overall application development 
by reducing spectrum availability for alternative uses.66 This can lower overall 
social welfare. Self-fulfilling prophecies, in which expectations about behavior 
                                                                                                             
at 13. 
 61 See, e.g., Dan Hays et al., supra note 49, at 15 (noting that incumbent licensees of 
desirable spectrum are unlikely to “vacate prime holdings due to the lack of alternatives”); 
Thomas W. Hazlett & Evan T. Leo, The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical 
and Economic Perspective, 26 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1053 (2011) (noting that 
“[a]llocating spectrum for unlicensed usage necessarily excludes certain wireless alterna-
tives”). 
 62 See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 38 (1983); see also Nat’l 
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
 63 See Chapter VI – Setting the Predicates: Communications Architecture Today and 
Tomorrow, THE ASPEN INST., http://csreports.aspeninstitute.org/Roundtable-on-Spectrum-
Policy/2013/report/details/0075/Spectrum (last visited Mar. 07, 2015). 
 64 Many companies, for example, are simultaneously able to make use of utility poles to 
deploy wireline infrastructure, and the FCC has authority to regulate rates, terms, and condi-
tions for pole attachments to “provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and 
reasonable.” See 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (2012); see also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra 
note 3, at 109. 
 65 See Preserving the Open Internet, Report & Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 at paras. 3, 
38 (2010); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634 (2014). 
 66 This is best exemplified by the largely irreversible decision to allocate a frequency 
band as either licensed or unlicensed use. See Coleman Bazelon, Licensed or unlicensed: 
The economic considerations in incremental spectrum allocations, 47 IEEE COMM. MAG. 
110, 110 (2009) (noting that there currently is no way to trade spectrum between licensed 
and unlicensed uses); MILGROM ET AL., supra note 39, at 2, ¶ 5 (noting that unlicensed use 
offers lower barriers to entry due to freedom from the need to negotiate with exclusive li-
cense holders); William H. Lehr, The Role of Unlicensed in Spectrum Reform, in INTERNET 
POLICY AND ECONOMICS 169, 174 (William H. Lehr & Lorenzo Maria Pupillo eds., 2d ed. 
2009), noting that flexible licensing favors network-centric service providers while unli-
censed favors an equipment-centric end-user model); Hazlett & Leo, supra note 61 (noting 
that “[a]llocating spectrum for unlicensed usage necessarily excludes certain wireless alter-
natives”). 
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propel that very behavior, as seen with Moore’s law, 67 are therefore problemat-
ic in a wireless context. 
Second, spectrum is a public resource that is “owned” by a nation’s citizen-
ry.68 As such, its exploitation carries a much stronger consideration of public 
welfare than many other resources; spectrum managers are obliged to balance 
the needs of scientific, non-commercial, and amateur users, as well as consid-
erations of free speech, public safety, the national defense, and equity.69 Any 
use of exclusive-use licenses, to the extent that they completely block off a 
spectrum band from public or government access for the length of the license, 
therefore should face an extremely strong burden of proof from a public policy 
perspective. 
Third, decisions about spectrum have longer time-scales and less reversibil-
ity than many other areas of policy.70 Moving incumbent users off spectrum 
bands in response to technological or economic changes, for example, is gen-
erally time-consuming, expensive, and contentious, often taking billions of 
dollars of upfront investment to facilitate relocation and more than a decade to 
complete.71 This arises in part because wireless industries are characterized by 
high up-front capital costs and generally need to meet minimum coverage areas 
and densities for business or licensing reasons.72 Moreover, the potential uses 
of a particular band of spectrum are often limited by physical constraints and 
interference from adjacent users, requiring regulators to explicitly pre-judge 
the potential applications of a spectrum band to maximize overall usage.73 Un-
                                                
 67 CORNELIUS DISCO & BAREND VAN DER MEULEN, GETTING NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO-
GETHER 206-07 (1998). 
 68 See Christian A. Herter, The Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Critical Natural Resource, 
25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 651, 655 (1985) (noting spectrum is a natural resource and that gen-
erally, natural resources within the geographic boundaries of a nation are owned by that 
nation); see generally J. Armand Musey, Broadcasting Licenses: Ownership Rights and the 
Spectrum Rationalization Challenge, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (2012) (discussing the 
quasi-property nature of spectrum licenses). 
 69 The FCC, for example, must determine “whether the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity will be served by the granting of” a spectrum license. See § 309(a); see also FED. 
COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 2, at 7, 40, 53. 
 70 See FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 78, 79. 
 71 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-472, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE 
OF THE ARMED SERVICES, U.S. SENATE: SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: FEDERAL RELOCATION 
COSTS AND AUCTION REVENUES 2, 3 (2013); see FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 
79 (noting historical time lags of between 6 and 13 years for reallocating spectrum). 
 72 See Spectrum Management: FCC’s Use and Management of Buildout Requirements: 
What GAO Found, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-
236 (last visited Mar. 07, 2015). 
 73 See, e.g., Hazlett & Leo, supra note 61; see also GREGORY L. ROSSTON, STANFORD 
INST. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF SPECTRUM ALLOCATION 
1, n. 2 (2014). 
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der many licensing regimes, incumbent wireless users also have little incentive 
to deploy future-proof receiver or transmitter technology even if marginal costs 
are low, and may also have the political power to stifle or slow down reloca-
tions in many cases (such as when adjacent incumbent GPS users successfully 
prevented LightSquared from launching a wholesale mobile network).74 This 
process has become even more difficult now that most lightly-used bands have 
already been cleared and reallocated.75 
Fourth, carriers have alternatives to additional spectrum for managing traffic 
demand, for both short- and long-term timescales. The amount of traffic a giv-
en amount of spectrum can handle is somewhat flexible. For example, wireless 
carriers can deploy additional cell sites to “densify” their networks or upgrade 
to more spectrally efficient technologies.76 Carriers can also encourage users to 
offload more of their traffic to Wi-Fi networks.77 
Carriers can and do use methods to adjust user behavior as well, including 
through pricing adjustments.78 Contrary to some critics, however, price ration-
ing of limited capacity is not the primary method of dealing with increased 
demand.79  In fact, U.S. wireless carriers have accommodated a massive in-
crease in wireless demand since the smartphone revolution without use of any 
significant new spectrum since FCC Auction 73 (the 2008 700 MHz auction).80  
For example, in 2010 the FCC released a report predicting that carriers would 
                                                
 74 See, e.g., Statement from FCC Spokesperson Tammy Sun on Letter from NTIA Ad-
dressing Harmful Interference Testing Conclusions Pertaining to Lightsquared and Global 
Positioning Systems, FCC (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0215/DOC-312479A1.txt. 
 75 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: 
REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT-HELD SPECTRUM TO SPUR ECONOMIC 
GROWTH vi (July 2012), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast_spectrum_report_final
_july_20_2012.pdf (noting the difficulty and cost of clearing and reallocating Federal spec-
trum for commercial use). 
 76 See FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 12. 
 77 RYSAVY RESEARCH, MOBILE BROADBAND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND THE NEED FOR 
OPTIMIZATION 21 (2010), available at 
http://www.rysavy.com/articles/2010_02_rysavy_mobile_broadband_capacity_constraints.p
df. 
 78 Zachary S. Bischof et al., Need, Want, Can Afford – Broadband Markets and the Be-
havior of Users, in IMC ‘14 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEAS-
UREMENT CONFERENCE 73,83 (2014), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2663753 
(“[T]he availability of faster services at a lower cost leads subscribers to sign up for services 
that will be less heavily used.”). In addition, carriers may leverage their influence with de-
vice makers and application platforms to limit particular uses of mobile devices that typical-
ly consume large amounts of data, such as tethering. 
 79 See Ford, supra note 13. 
 80 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 78 (describing the spectrum allocations to 
mobile services from 1983 to 2008, and the corresponding spike in demand and innovation). 
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have a 300 MHz spectrum deficit by 2014.81 U.S. carriers, however, are not 
using any significant amount of spectrum allocated since the FCC’s Auction 73 
in 2008 to address that deficit and significant portions of the spectrum allocat-
ed in the Auction 73, and before, remain minimally used.82  Moreover, despite 
significant capital investment by U.S. carriers,83 the U.S. still has significantly 
lower cell site density than many other countries and new small cell site tech-
nologies to allow further densification of wireless networks are rapidly grow-
ing.84 Spectrum exhaust is simply not on the horizon. 
In addition, the viability of “new” spectrum allocation to address these is-
sues may be limited. A typical spectrum reallocation precedes service deploy-
ment by many years due to the lengthy process of identifying and testing can-
didate bands, designing and conducting the auction, and relocating incumbent 
users.85 Carriers must then identify potential new cell sites or upgrade candi-
dates, develop and deploy new infrastructure, and manage any potential 
sources of interference, which leads to a gradual process of deploying new in-
frastructure for managing demand.86 In addition, only after spectrum has been 
authoritatively licensed is it rational for equipment manufacturers to invest in 
developing necessary hardware and for service providers to raise money to 
build-out new services. 
Spectrum demand forecasts are therefore critical for regulators to efficiently 
allocate spectrum and maximize overall social benefit. As a result of the long 
lead-time between spectrum allocation and start of service, regulators rely on 
demand projections years into the future to help guide their decisions.87 They 
                                                
 81 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 26. 
 82 Neal Gompa, T-Mobile buys Verizon’s Lower 700 MHz Spectrum to Enable Broad 
Coverage 200Mbps  LTE,  EXTREME TECH (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.extremetech.com/computing/174299-t-mobile-buys-verizons-lower-700mhz-
spectrum-to-enable-broad-coverage-200mbps-lte (explaining that Verizon was not using the 
A-Block). 
 83 See Background on CTIA’s Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA 12 (June 2014), 
http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/Facts-Stats/ctia_survey_ye_2013_graphics-
final.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (stating that U.S. carriers have invested a cumulative total of nearly $400 
billion since 1985). 
 84 See Sean Kinney, Some 75 Mobile Network Operators Have Deployed Small Cells, 
RCRWIRELESSNEWS (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.rcrwireless.com/20150319/hetnet-
news/small-cell-shipments-top-10-million (noting 10.2 million small cell units being used 
by 75 mobile network operators). 
 85 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 79 (noting that historically it has taken 
6 to 13 years to reallocate spectrum, from first step to availability for use). 
 86 See id. at XII-XIII (describing the spectrum allocations to mobile services from 1983 
to 2008, and the corresponding spike in demand and innovation). 
 87 See id. at 79 (noting historical time lags of between 6 and 13 years for reallocating 
spectrum); see generally Dr. Robert Roche, Mobile Usage Continues to Increase + Projec-
tion Say Skyrocketing Demand = More Spectrum Required, CTIA BLOG (Feb. 6, 2015), 
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also use application-specific demand forecasts to help determine whether clear-
ing spectrum bands is profitable and what conditions (such as participation 
restrictions, interference mitigation methods, or buildout requirements) should 
apply to various spectrum bands.88 These decisions in turn significantly shape 
how wireless industries evolve and what kind of wireless infrastructure is de-
ployed. Ensuring that demand data is as reliable as possible, and that measures 
are taken to mitigate risk of error, is therefore essential for effective spectrum 
management. This paper, however, finds evidence that, despite the importance, 
regulators have come to rely on reports that have repeatedly proven to be inac-
curate and have taken few measures to adjust policies or mitigate the risk of 
error going forward. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II examines 
several major demand forecasts and assesses their reliability through qualita-
tive and statistical evidence. Section III explores some possible underlying 
reasons for inaccuracy in these reports. Due to the small overall number of 
such forecasts, larger-scale econometric analyses are infeasible, so the analysis 
focuses on general trends and themes. Section IV focuses on methods to miti-
gate errors going forward, while Section V presents some spectrum-specific 
policy suggestions and concluding thoughts. 
II. MAJOR DATA FORECASTS AND THEIR HISTORICAL RELIABILITY 
Many spectrum demand estimates, even those used to determine national 
policy, are conducted by private entities rather than government agencies.89 
Expert agencies rely on these estimates, perhaps by combining and/or averag-
ing several forecasts at once, for policy analysis and planning, either due to 
lack of sufficient in-house expertise or for cost and time reasons.90 When gov-
ernment agencies do directly address demand, they often commission spectrum 
demand projections from outside experts.91 While this may be justified by an 
                                                                                                             
http://blog.ctia.org/2015/02/06/mobile-usage-more-spectrum-required/ (demonstrating the 
necessity of projections in determining spectrum usage). 
 88 Such factors are key in FCC rulemakings about spectrum auction policies and proce-
dures. See, e.g., Spectrum Management, supra note 72. 
 89 See, e.g., CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC 
FORECAST UPDATE, 2012-2017 (2013), available at 
http://newsroom.cisco.com/documents/10157/1142732/Cisco_VNI_Mobile_Data_Traffic_F
orecast_2012_2017_white_paper.pdf. 
 90 Tim Farrar, Is Cisco Stacking the Deck with its Mobile Data Numbers?, GIGAOM 
(Feb. 09, 2013, 10:30 AM), https://gigaom.com/2013/02/09/is-cisco-stacking-the-deck-with-
its-mobile-data-numbers/. 
 91 Examples include the FCC using projections from Cisco, the Canadian Government 
using Plumb Research projections, and Ofcom’s use of Real Wireless projections. See also 
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internal lack of appropriate econometric and technical expertise, it may also 
reduce the quality of external and oversight scrutiny about the results. Such 
scrutiny can also consume significant amounts of agency time and resources.92 
By pointing to market estimates and referring to outside expertise, on the other 
hand, agencies are able to suggest an industry consensus and avoid industry 
and government challenges to their data.93 Of course, to the extent the estimates 
in the market are inaccurate, the range of estimates used by the government 
agencies will have the same shortcomings. 
A. Industry Participant Forecasts 
Industry forecasts are among the most common and most frequently updated 
spectrum forecasts.94 For example, the Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI), 
which projects wireless and wireline demand four to six years into the future, 
has estimated mobile demand for many years, is widely cited, and in recent 
years has faced few competing projections.95 
However, Cisco VNI projections have proven unreliable when compared to 
their actual measurements and updated projections (Chart II-1).96 For example, 
over the most recent seven forecasts, overestimates were nearly twice as fre-
quent as underestimates (19 vs. 10).97 Overestimates are also on average of 
greater magnitude than underestimates (103 vs. 81 PB/month).98 Cisco’s over-
estimation was particularly high in their 2011-2016 forecast;99 the two subse-
quent reports have featured demand forecasts approximately twenty-five per-
                                                                                                             
id. 
 92 See generally Steven J. Crowley, Three Invalid Assumptions that Make the FCC’s 
Spectrum Requirements Model Skew High, STEVEN CROWLEY (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://stevencrowley.com/2011/11/19/three-invalid-assumptions-that-make-the-fcc’s-
spectrum-requirements-model-skew-high/. 
 93 See id. 
 94 See, e.g., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 5-6. 
 95 See, e.g., Farrar, supra note 90 (illustrating the authority of Cisco’s mobile VNI fore-
cast). 
 96 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco 
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017. 
 97 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco 
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017. 
 98 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco 
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017. 
 99 See CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC 
FORECAST UPDATE, 2011-2016 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.puremobile.com/media/infortis/documents/cisco_mobile_forecast.pdf. 
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cent lower.100 Moreover, the longer the timeframe, the more likely the estimates 
are likely to be over-projections due to exponential growth issues.101 
Perhaps Cisco’s most significant forecast inaccuracy was its 2012 projec-
tions for Western European mobile traffic. In February 2012, Cisco estimated 
that December traffic (ten months later) would be 366 PB.102 But in February 
2013, Cisco had lowered this projection more than fifty percent, to 181 PB.103 
Some analysts consider the 180 PB figure to also be too high.104 
 
Chart II-1: Cisco VNI Estimates Over Time105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 100 See CISCO, supra note 89, at 3; CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST 
AND METHODOLOGY 2013-2018 (2014), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/global-cloud-index-
gci/Cloud_Index_White_Paper.pdf. 
 101 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco 
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017. 
 102 CISCO, supra note 99, at 24; Cisco Slashes its Mobile Data Forecasts, But the Num-
bers Still Look Far too High, ANALYSYS MASON (Feb. 15, 2013) 
http://www.analysysmason.com/About-Us/News/Insight/Cisco-mobile-data-forecasts-
Feb2013/. 
 103 CISCO, supra note 89, at 27; see also Cisco Slashes its Mobile Data Forecasts, supra 
note 102. 
 104 Cisco Slashes its Mobile Data Forecasts, supra note 102. 
 105 Author’s calculations based on Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecasts and Cisco 
Visual Networking Index spanning a timeframe of 2007-2017. 
Sources: Cisco Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast; Cisco Visual Networking 
Index; author's calculations 	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B. International  
l. Group Forecasts 
The ITU has also endorsed a set of spectrum demand projections that were 
last updated in 2006.106 These projections combined a variety of industry and 
research forecasts (Chart II-2) and indicate that, on average, between 1280 
MHz and 1720 MHz of spectrum will be needed by 2020.107 The ITU stratified 
the estimates based on potential need scenarios, but even the low end of the 
estimate is well above the FCC’s estimate that the U.S. will need 500 MHz of 
additional wireless spectrum by then (supplementing the already 547 MHz 
available for mobile broadband as of 2010).108 However, considering its high 
level of economic development and device penetration, by ITU’s own criteria, 
the U.S. should garner at least an “average need” classification, which would 
widen the disparity between ITU and FCC.109 
Mobile industry analyst Tim Farrar notes that the ITU forecasts imply typi-
cal global demand per square kilometer in 2020 will be 100 times greater than 
the demand in the 1 kilometer square area around the 2014 Super Bowl stadi-
um during the game – arguably one the highest traffic events in the world.110 
Despite their age and a lack of updates to recalibrate baseline figures, however, 
these ITU estimates are still cited in policy debates, for example by CTIA.111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 106 See, e.g., INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ESTIMATED SPECTRUM BANDWIDTH REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF IMT -2000 AND IMT-ADVANCED (2006), available 
at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/opb/rep/R-REP-M.2078-2006-PDF-E.pdf. 
 107 See id. at 1. 
 108 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 84. 
 109 See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, FUTURE SPECTRUM REQUIREMENTS ESTIMATE ON TER-
RESTRIAL IMT 9 (2013), available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/go/patents/en. 
 110 Tim Farrar, A Hundred Superbowls per Sq KM?, TMF ASSOCIATES MSS BLOG (June 
06, 2014), http://tmfassociates.com/blog/2014/06/17/a-hundred-superbowls-per-sq-km/ 
 111 See Marinho, supra note 37; CTIA, ITU: More Spectrum is Essential, CTIA – THE 
WIRELESS ASS’N BLOG (Oct. 23, 2012), http://blog.ctia.org/2011/02/14/itu-more-spectrum-
is-essential/. 
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Chart II-2: Projections used by ITU112 
 
Mobile global data traffic estimates from 2011 to 2015 based on multiple 
sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The disparity between different types of estimates included in the report is 
suggestive. The two highest estimates were from equipment manufacturers 
(Cisco and Alcatel-Lucent), which tend to directly benefit from spectrum real-
locations to MNOs, since they sell much of the equipment used in such reloca-
tions and subsequent infrastructure redeployment.113 The two lowest projec-
tions were conducted by independent research firms (Informa and Analysy 
Mason).114 As noted in Section IV, even independent research firms may have 
institutional relationships and biases that potentially hinder complete objectivi-
ty. However, independent research firms have a less direct relationship to the 
benefits of additional spectrum allocation, so it is reasonable to expect that 
                                                
 112 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ASSESSMENT OF THE GLOBAL MOBILE BROADBAND DE-
PLOYMENTS AND FORECASTS FOR INTERNATIONAL MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 16 (2011), 
available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/opb/rep/R-REP-M.2243-2011-PDF-E.pdf. 
 113 Id. at 6. 
 114 Id. at 18. 
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they are less likely, on average, to be subject to such biases than equipment 
manufacturers or service providers. 
Furthermore, a 2011 ITU report115 noted that earlier ITU projections, made 
in 2005 (ITU-R M.2072), were too low based on traffic growth in the interven-
ing time period.116 This suggests that the ITU’s aggressive projections two 
years later, in 2006,117 were, at some level, a reaction to perceptions of earlier 
underestimation. A chart from the 2011 report with 2005 and newer projec-
tions is shown in Chart II-3 below. 
 
 
Chart II-3: ITU traffic estimates done at year 2005 (Report ITU-R 
M.2072)118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 115 See generally id. ITU is the leading publisher of telecommunication technolo-
gy, regulatory and standard information. A report labeled ITU-R, means that the report was 
published by the Radio Communication Sector of ITU. Id. 
 116 Id. at 15. 
 117 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 106. 
 118 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 112, at 15. 
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Like the ITU, the FCC has only made limited efforts to develop independent 
spectrum projections. The FCC relied heavily on estimates from Cisco, ITU, 
Ofcom, and other outside groups for the 2010 National Broadband Report’s 
spectrum allocation recommendations.119 These recommendations called for 
allocation of an additional 300 MHz for mobile broadband spectrum between 
2010 and 2015, and 500 MHz by 2020.120 The FCC further justified this projec-
tion through a technical paper that estimated a 275 MHz deficit by 2014.121 
Despite being the only technical analysis of spectrum requirements conducted 
by the FCC in recent years, this paper did not make independent demand esti-
mates but relied on an average of three sets of spectrum demand projections 
(Cisco, Coda, and Yankee Group, with Cisco’s being the highest), with limited 
further analysis (Chart II-4).122 
 
Chart II-4: Demand Forecasts Used by FCC123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 119 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 76-77, 84. 
 120 See id. at 75, 84. 
 121 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 26. 
 122 Id. at 9, Exhibit 4. 
 123 Id. 
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Chart II-5: FCC Traffic Projections vs. Actual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The National Broadband Plan’s recommendations, as further developed in 
various executive-branch policies, remain the framework for current U.S. spec-
trum policy, and the FCC has made significant progress in meeting its interim 
goal of 300 MHz of additional mobile broadband spectrum.124 However, as 
Chart II-5 shows, the Plan’s forecast results did not come to fruition.125 The 
U.S. mobile broadband traffic figures used in the plan’s development have not 
actually increased at the rate projected by the FCC.126 
The actual traffic acceleration from 2012 to 2013 is likely the result of wire-
less carriers with excess capacity re-introducing unlimited data plans during 
the year.127 As discussed in Section I.D, significant allocated spectrum remains 
unused in the U.S. The ability to reintroduce mass unlimited plans while leav-
ing significant amounts of spectrum unused indicates that spectrum exhaust is 
not currently a significant factor in the business decisions of certain MVNOs.  
Moreover, it is not clear that demand based on usage in a near-zero marginal 
                                                
 124 U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, FOURTH INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE TEN-YEAR 
PLAN AND TIMETABLE AND PLAN FOR QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF SPECTRUM USAGE 17-
18 (2014). 
 125 Author’s analysis. See also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 18-19, Exhib-
its 10-11; Ford, supra note 13, at 5 tbl. 1. 
 126 The Difference is calculated by subtracting the (Predicted Cum. Growth Index (2010 
FCC Est)) from the (Actual Cum. Growth Index & YE 2014 Est.). See Ford, supra note 13, 
at 5. 
 127 See, e.g., Mike Dano, H2O offers unlimited service on AT&T network for $60/month, 
FIERCEWIRELESS.com, (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/h2o-offers-
unlimited-service-att-network-60month/2011-09-02; see also Marguerite Reardon, Wireless 
spectrum shortage? What spectrum shortage?, CNET (Sept. 27, 2011, 5:40 PM), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/wireless-spectrum-shortage-what-spectrum-shortage/. 
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cost environment is the appropriate measurement to use for public policy deci-
sions to allocate a finite resource. 
2. Ofcom Projections and UK Policy 
In June 2013, the British telecom regulator Ofcom released a spectrum de-
mand forecast conducted by Real Wireless.128 As some analysts noted, this re-
port predicted an effective demand of 10 petabytes per square kilometer by 
2020.129  After some criticism of this figure, the report was revised downward 
by a factor of 1,000, to 10 terabytes per square kilometer in the final version, 
released March 11, 2014.130 Ofcom did not explain the change and stated that: 
“since the report has served its purpose we do not plan to carry out any further 
work to update it.”131 The magnitude of swings in projection undermines its 
methodological credibility, as well as related policy decisions.132 
III. FOUR POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR UNRELIABLE 
FORECASTING 
Spectrum demand forecasts present unusual challenges. Unlike most goods, 
few consumers want spectrum itself; they want to make phone calls, send text 
messages, access the internet, send email, and stream video and music.133 
Moreover, the amount of spectrum needed for a consumer voice and data ap-
plications can change dramatically depending on the technology employed by 
the operator, external factors such as the development of applications and ap-
plication markets, and an operator’s pricing and billing model.134 This section 
explores several analytical, structural, and economic factors that help explain 
why spectrum forecast tend towards unreliability. In isolation, each factor 
highlights the inherent uncertainty of predicting mobile demand and the 
                                                
 128 REAL WIRELESS, supra note 42. 
 129 See Tim Farrar, Note to the telecom industry: Beware of false models, GIGAOM.COM 
(Feb. 22, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://gigaom.com/2014/02/22/note-to-the-telecom-industry-
beware-of-false-models/; see also Farrar, supra note 110. 
 130 REAL WIRELESS, supra note 42, at 55, fig. 44; see also Farrar, supra note 110. 
 131 Future Demand for Mobile Broadband Spectrum and Consideration of Potential 
Candidate Bands, OFCOM, http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/cfi-mobile-bb 
(last updated Mar. 18, 2013). 
 132 See Farrar, supra note 110. 
 133 See Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 1, 
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/. 
 134 See CISCO, supra note 89, at 2-3, 25-26 (noting a need for large estimate updates due 
to unforeseen changes in business models, device usage, and traffic management systems). 
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amount of spectrum required to satisfy this demand. Together, however, these 
elements compound to produce far higher overall levels of uncertainty. 
A. Technical reasons for bias 
There are several technical reasons for bias in spectrum forecasts including: 
1. Limited Use of Risk Management and Transparency 
Spectrum forecasters make little use of (or at least, often do not release) risk 
management techniques in their analysis. Sensitivity analysis, scenario analy-
sis, and error ranges are all standard risk analysis tools for complex models 
where data sources and relationships are uncertain.135 Cisco’s methodology, 
which “begins with the number and growth of connections and devices, applies 
adoption rates for applications, and then multiplies the application’s user base 
by Cisco’s estimated minutes of use and KB per minute for that application,” 136 
exemplifies such a complex model.  Although such added complexity can ul-
timately improve a prediction by incorporating and correcting for various sub-
tle influences, the cost is often uncertainty and variance.137 
Reporting a single number, for example, is misleading because it implies a 
stronger certainty than an econometric or analytic model is capable of, espe-
cially in the case of multi-step models.138 Moreover, only loosely associating a 
result with its methodological underpinnings allows other organizations to 
more easily ignore qualifications and other nuance, facilitating the processes 
that disconnect the origins of a projection with its subsequent rhetorical and 
policy uses.139 This also helps contribute to the longevity of cited projections; 
U.S. spectrum policy, for example, still works on the assumption that 500 MHz 
of new spectrum is needed even though that estimate was made four years ago 
and the wireless market has changed substantially since then.140 
                                                
 135 See DAVID VOSE, SCENARIO ANALYSIS: A QUANTITATIVE GUIDE, 4, 47 (2008); Sce-
nario Analysis: A Tool for Task Managers, WORLDBANK, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSIA/Resources/490023-
1121114603600/13053_scenarioanalysis.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). 
 136 CISCO, supra note 13, at 37. 
 137 See, e.g., Louis Anthony Cox, Jr, Internal Dose, Uncertainty Analysis and Complexi-
ty of Risk Models, 25 ENV’T. INT’L 841, 841-42, 847 (1999); Jacques LeLorier et al., Dis-
crepancies between Meta-Analyses and Subsequent Large Randomized, Controlled Trials, 
337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 536. 536 (1997). 
 138 See generally GEORGE C. JUDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
ECONOMETRICS, 1, 5 (1998). 
 139 Sanchez, supra note 16. 
 140 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 75, 84. 
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Moreover, the Cisco forecast uses “Ovum, Machina, Strategy Analytics, In-
fonetics, Gartner, IDC, Dell’Oro, Synergy, ACG Research, Nielsen, comScore, 
Verto Analytics, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), CTIA, 
and telecommunications regulators in each of the countries covered by VNI.”141 
Although using all available data sources is generally an analytical best prac-
tice, combining data from many sources may also increase errors and uncer-
tainties from data compatibility issues and different methodologies, and reduc-
es the number of comparable independent assessments that can serve to ground 
or calibrate an assessment.142 Combining data sources also presents risk of a 
form of publication bias, because these sources and analyses are often only 
reported upon successful conclusion of a particular industry-analyst contract; 
unfavorable analyses are more likely to be terminated before publication or 
result in incomplete or low-quality data that must be omitted to preserve over-
all analytical quality.143 
The lack of detailed methodological and risk information is also part of a 
more general trend for industry analysts to closely guard their methodologies 
and data.144 As the U.S. Government Accountability Office notes, “according to 
experts and government officials, industry associations do not always disclose 
their proprietary data sources and methods, making it difficult to verify their 
estimates.”145 Although there may be good business reasons for doing so in the 
case of industry reports and analyses,146 it is more difficult to make the case 
that regulators making decisions about public resources should rely on such 
estimates when assumptions and methodology are opaque. 
2. Exponential Estimation 
Spectrum demand forecasts typically employ exponential estimation meth-
ods for extrapolating demand growth, “based on existing mobile broadband 
growth and new trends” in Internet and telephone services.147 However, this 
means small errors or uncertainties can become extremely large at the edges of 
the forecast’s time horizon. For example, the standard deviation of the external 
                                                
 141 CISCO, supra note 13, at 36. 
 142 Robert E. Slavin, Best-Evidence Synthesis: An Alternative to Meta-Analytic and Tra-
ditional Reviews, 15 EDUC. RESEARCHER 5, 5 (1986). 
 143 See Robert Rosenthal, The “File Drawer Problem” and Tolerance for Null Results, 
86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 638, 638 (1979). 
 144 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-762T, INSIGHTS GAINED FROM 
EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS IN THE U.S. 
ECONOMY 5, 8 (2013). 
 145 Id. at 8. 
 146 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 19, at 8. 
 147 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 112. 
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data sources that the ITU used to estimate average global mobile data traffic 
from 2011 to 2015 steadily and rapidly increased (Table III-1).148 When the 
past five Cisco estimates are projected to 2018 using comparable Internet 
growth rates, they also show high variances in the final predictions (Chart III-
1).149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 148 The authors used their own calculations to create the numbers in Table III-1. For the 
initial numbers usein their calculations. See id. (stating that by 2020, mobile traffic will have 
increased 33 times from 2010 figures). 
 149 The authors used their own calculations to create the numbers in Chart III-1. For the 
initial numbers used in their calculations, please see CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING 
INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORECAST UPDATE, 2009-2014 12 (2010), available 
at http://www.slideshare.net/danilogj/global-mobile-data-traffic-forecast-update-2009-2014; 
CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORECAST UP-
DATE, 2010-2015 19 (2011), available at http://tmfassociates.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Cisco-mobile-VNI-Feb-2011.pdf; CISCO, supra note 99, at 24; 
CISCO, supra note 89, at 27; CISCO, supra note 100 . Data were extrapolated using lagged 
growth rates for wireline Internet traffic. 
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3. Pricing and Business Developments 
Mobile demand, even if it could be directly measured, will usually exceed 
actual supply (i.e., mobile network traffic) due to carrier pricing and policy 
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adjustments.150 Most goods and services, for example, have elastic demand 
curves - as price increases, demand decreases and vice versa.151 Mobile broad-
band is no exception, with carriers continually making a number of pricing 
adjustments during the boom in smart phone and mobile data usage.152 
However few goods or services have pricing policies that change as rapidly 
as seen in the mobile broadband market, which faces demands for higher 
speeds and data usage at uncertain rates of change.153 Moreover, it is not appro-
priate to interpret most carrier pricing adjustments as solely dedicated to reduc-
ing data usage. Between 2007 and 2010, most wireless operators, like AT&T, 
offered unlimited voice and data for relatively low monthly fees,154 but have 
since ceased those plans,155 now finding themselves in trouble for data throt-
tling those who are still on the original plans.156 As smart phone penetration 
increased during the 2010 - 2011 time frame, wireless companies began mi-
grating users to plans with data caps, although some customers remained 
grandfathered into the original plan.157 Incremental use beyond that of a fixed 
                                                
 150 See Ford, supra note 13, at 2, 4 (noting that demand is not directly observable and 
that actual traffic represents a mix of demand- and supply-side factors, including price in-
creases, offloading, and rationing). 
 151 Gerhard Adam, Economic Theory – Supply and Demand, SCIENCE2.0 (July 10, 2009), 
http://www.science20.com/gerhard_adam/blog/economic_theory_–_supply_and_demand. 
 152 Most notably, this occurred when major carriers began transitioning from unlimited 
to tiered data plans. See, e.g., Peter Suciu, Mobile users to carriers: ‘Give me my unlimited 
data,’ FORTUNE (Sept. 13, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/09/13/mobile-users-to-carriers-
give-me-my-unlimited-data. 
 153 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION & THE BROADBAND COMM’N, THE STATE OF BROADBAND 
2014: BROADBAND FOR ALL 23 (2014), available at 
http://www.broadbandcommission.org/documents/reports/bb-annualreport2014.pdf. 
 154 Timothy Stenovec, AT&T Sued for Reducing Speed of ‘Unlimited’ Data Plans, HUFF-
INGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/28/att-slowing-
speeds-data-throttling-ftc_n_6062360.html; Sinead Carew, Verizon to eliminate unlimited 
data plans, REUTERS (July 5, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/us-
verizonwireless-tiered-data-idUSTRE7645SF20110705; Lisa Eadicicco, Which Carrier is 
the Best? Here’s How Data Prices Compare for Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile, BUS. 
INSIDER (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/verizon-vs-att-sprint-tmobile-
carrier-data-plan-pricing-2014-9 (until 2010 each of the four major U.S. carriers offered 
unlimited data plans to new customers; Verizon and AT&T have discontinued new unlim-
ited data plans). 
 155 JR Raphael, Smartphone Data Shake-Up: The End of ‘Unlimited,’ COMPUTERWORLD 
(Feb. 8, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/249532/smartphone_data_shake_up_the_end_of_unlimited.
html. 
 156 Lisa Schifferie, FTC sues AT&T for limiting “unlimited data,” FED. TRADE COMMIS-
SION (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/ftc-sues-att-limiting-unlimited-data. 
 157 Stenovec, supra note 154; Sinead Carew, AT&T to end unlimited use mobile data 
plan, REUTERS (June 2, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/02/us-att-
idUSTRE6513H120100602 (stating that AT&T eliminated unlimited data plans for new 
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plan was no longer free for most users.158  Partially as a result, usage, particu-
larly among heavy users declined significantly.159 Evidence shows much of the 
decline was due to a reduction in usage in the top 1% of users, whose usage 
declined from 52% in 2010 to 18% in 2014.160 
It is unclear, however, whether the carriers’ primary motivation for ending 
unlimited data plans for new subscribers was spectral capacity. While the end 
of the unlimited data plans may have been implemented partly to control usage 
to ensure quality of service, it may also reflect a desire of the wireless carriers 
to increase revenue and leverage increase market power following several 
years of mergers that increased industry concentration.161 Allowing existing 
customers to keep their unlimited plans (even if subject to potential throttling) 
also creates high switching costs for users who would lose those plans if they 
switched providers. This potentially lowers expensive subscriber churn for the 
carriers. At the same time, carriers have persisted in some policies that increase 
data usage, including the reintroduction of unlimited data plans.162 
Analysts forecasting spectrum demand rarely have access to detailed infor-
mation about carriers’ business plans or technology rollout, and therefore must 
make assumptions that results in inaccurate data forecasts.163 This puts them at 
a significant disadvantage when predicting demand induced by changes in 
technology implementation and/or pricing. However, none of these business 
plans were unforeseeable, and demand projections that employed proper risk 
                                                                                                             
customers on June 7, 2010); Carew, supra note 154 (stating that Verizon eliminated unlim-
ited data plans to new customers on July 7, 2011); Tero Kuittinen, AT&T and Verizon are 
about to put the squeeze on subscribers, BGR (June 21, 2013), 
http://bgr.com/2013/06/21/att-verizon-fees-analysis (noting that AT&T and Verizon account 
for approximately 65% of U.S. subscribers); Eadicicco, supra note 154 (noting that T-
Mobile and Sprint have retained their unlimited data plans). 
 158 Stenovec, supra note 154; Carew, supra note 154; Eadicicco, supra note 154 (stating 
that data plans no longer allowed for unlimited usage, but now provided fixed data plans, 
with the exception of T-Mobile and Sprint that still issue unlimited data plans). 
 159 J. Armand Musey, Wireless Demand Projections- Elasticity of the Top-1% of Users, 
GA GOLDIN ASSOCIATES (Jan. 26, 2014), http://www.goldinassociates.com/blogs/telecom-
media-tech/wireless-demand-projections-elasticity-of-the-top-1-percent-users/; see CISCO, 
supra note 89, at 17 (stating that unlimited data plans dropped from 81% to 45%, while 
tiered data plans grew during a three year study from 2011-2013). 
 160 CISCO, supra note 14, at 2. 
 161 Jon Brodkin, Analysis: Wireless data caps more about profit than congestion, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 8, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/staff/2014/10/analysis-wireless-data-caps-
more-about-profit-than-congestion; Steven Musil, AT&T completes $1.2B acquisition of 
Leap Wireless, CNET (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/at-t-completes-1-2b-
acquisition-of-leap-wireless/. 
 162 Victor Luckerson, Unlimited Data Plans: Are They Coming Back From the Dead?, 
TIME (Aug. 23, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/08/23/unlimited-data-plans-are-they-
coming-back-from-the-dead. 
 163 Crowley, supra note 92. 
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analysis tools could have included the possibility of such business plan chang-
es in their models, rather than consistently citing data projections from external 
sources or reporting only a single scenario.164 Cisco, for example, cited the 
move to tiered business plans as one reason for its large downward revision of 
its 2011-2016 mobile demand forecasts.165 In recent months, the U.S. wireless 
industry has begun to lower prices and embrace unlimited data plans once 
again, as well as more aggressively marketing data-share plans.166 This is clear-
ly not a move it would do if facing a situation of spectrum exhaust. As a result, 
we expect an increase in usage as zero-cost marginal pricing will encourage 
usage with minimal value. 
More fundamentally, the definition of mobile “demand” is uncertain and can 
change depending on context. If the definition of demand is demand with no 
marginal cost, it is likely to be quite high.167 From a policy perspective, it is 
questionable whether demand at no marginal cost is an appropriate measure of 
social need.168 Supplying spectrum to mobile broadband based on demand at 
zero marginal cost encourages people to use spectrum for purposes with mini-
mal value and risks, depriving allocation for other uses with much higher mar-
ginal value.169 However, demand measured at a certain price per MB is also 
problematic. Future applications may require multiples of throughputs, just as 
today’s applications require multiples of bandwidth of applications in use 5 to 
10 years ago.170 If projections assume the price per MB remains constant, aver-
                                                
 164 Id. 
 165 CISCO, supra note 89, at 4. 
 166 Luckerson, supra note 162. 
 167 William Spaulding, Pure Monopoly: Demand, Revenue and Costs, Price Determina-
tion, Profit Maximization and Loss Minimization, THISMATTER.COM, 
http://thismatter.com/economics/pure-monopoly-demand-revenue-costs-profits.htm (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2015) (referring to the Price Determination model, which shows high de-
mand when marginal cost is at zero). 
 168 A similar argument can also be made for wireless demand for fixed applications 
(wireline substitution). Is it appropriate for such demand to be considered, for public policy 
purposes, as a measure of social need given that a wireline alternative is available? We do 
no attempt to resolve this issue in this paper, but flag it for future discussion. 
 169 At zero marginal cost, individuals would use bandwidth until marginal benefits are 
zero, for example, by using mobile broadband even when comparable Wi-Fi networks with 
less capacity restrictions are available. See Austin Frakt, Simply put: Marginal cost/benefit, 
THE INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/simply-put-marginal-costbenefit (relating a 
similar dynamic in health care, where if the cost of medical care was $0, individuals would 
use medical services indiscriminately without regards to overall or societal cost until the 
marginal benefit also equals $0). 
 170 In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Capability to all Americans in Reasonable and Timely Fashion and Possible steps to 
Accelerate Such a Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 2015 Broadband Progress Re-
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age consumer bills would increase to many multiples of current bills. This 
would clearly be unaffordable for most consumers, and does not take into ac-
count properly both increasing spectral efficiency and increasing cell site den-
sification, which both reduce overall spectrum need171 and have led to steadily 
decreasing per-unit costs in the mobile industry.172 Clearly, demand modeling 
needs to assume some marginal cost, but one that declines over time to match 
the increasing availability of technology to deliver throughput at reasonable 
prices. 
4. Offloading and Other Technological Developments 
a. Rapid growth in Wi-Fi offloading 
Offloading to small cells or Wi-Fi networks is another significant driver of 
wireless demand changes. Globally, traffic offloaded onto fixed networks in-
creased from 31% (14.3 PB/month)173 in 2010 to 46% (1.2 EB/month) in 
2014.174 This traffic bypasses the carriers’ networks, reducing the carriers’ need 
for dedicated spectrum to accommodate mobile traffic.175 Given the increasing 
ease of Wi-Fi deployment176  and growing consumer expectation of Wi-Fi 
availability,177 it is likely the trend towards increasing Wi-Fi offloading will 
increase.  Additionally, the FCC has proposed adding up to 195 MHz in the 5 
GHz band of spectrum for unlicensed access that supports Wi-Fi and similar 
transmission technologies, and 100 MHz in the 3.5 GHz band for small-cell 
                                                                                                             
port, 30 FCC Rcd 1375 para. 29-32, available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-10A1.pdf. 
 171 See FED. COMMN’CS COMM’N, supra note 34, at 6. 
 172 Roger Entner, Entner: What is the price of a megabyte of wireless data?, FierceWire-
less, http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/entner-what-price-megabyte-wireless-data/2011-
04-13. 
 173 CISCO 2010-2015, supra note 149, at 2. 
 174 CISCO, supra note 14, at 22. 
 175 Kyunghan Lee et al., Mobile data offloading: how much can WiFi deliver?, 21 
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 536, 536 (2012), available at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6353239. 
 176 iPass Wi-Fi Growth Map Shows 1 Public Hotspot for Every 20 people on Earth by 
2018, IPASS, http://www.ipass.com/press-releases/ipass-wi-fi-growth-map-shows-one-
public-hotspot-for-every-20-people-on-earth-by-2018/ (last visited May 8, 2015) (estimating 
that Wi-Fi hotspots will increase from 47.7 million hotspots globally at year-end 2014 to 
more than 340 million by 2018). 
 177 Total Wi-Fi® device shipments to surpass ten billion this month, WI-FI ALLIANCE 
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.wi-fi.org/news-events/newsroom/total-wi-fi-device-shipments-to-
surpass-ten-billion-this-month (noting that roughly 4.5 billion Wi-Fi products are in use as 
of January 2015). Many contemporary devices, such as certain tablets, laptops, and smart 
entertainment devices, can access broadband service only through Wi-Fi. 
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use on a shared basis.178 More than 1000 MHz of additional spectrum currently 
used or shared by the U.S. federal government is under consideration for re-
purposing, much of it on a shared basis.179 This additional spectrum is likely to 
facilitate additional offloading from wireless carriers’ networks, particularly in 
urban environments where demand is highest and small cell sites most effec-
tive.180 
Offloading was another major factor in Cisco’s large downward revisions of 
its 2011-2016 demand estimates, although the company also cited a slowdown 
in new mobile laptop connections.181 However, Cisco has been tracking of-
floading trends since at least 2010,182 and such a large trend towards offloading 
again could have been predicted using reasonable risk management techniques 
and multi-scenario forecasting. 
It is important to note that offloading does not represent a true supply-side 
adjustment in the larger context of spectrum policy.183 Offloading is still wire-
less data transmission that uses spectral resources, albeit in an alternate, more 
socially optimal, configuration, especially in certain densely populated areas.184 
Moreover, offloading allows for the stratification of different types of mobile 
data; for many consumer applications with low quality-of-service require-
ments, Wi-Fi offers comparable service with no noticeable degradation, allow-
ing exclusive-use mobile spectrum to better serve highly sensitive needs.185 
Thus, offloading represents the most tangible and important example of the 
direct tradeoff that regulators must make when allocating spectral resources 
and highlights alternative arrangements to exclusive-use licenses that can satis-
fy increases in mobile demand. 
                                                
 178 In the Matter of Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules to Permit Unlicensed 
National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) Devices in the 5 GHz Band, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 13-49, 28 FCC Rcd 1769 para. 2 (Feb. 20, 2013). 
 179 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 124, at 6, 19. 
 180 WIRELESS 20/20, CARRIER WIFI OFFLOAD: BUILDING A BUSINESS CASE FOR CARRIER 
WIFI OFFLOAD 2-3 (2012), available at 
http://www.wireless2020.com/docs/CarrierWiFiOffloadWhitePaper03202012.pdf (noting 
that return of investment for offloading scales with population density). 
 181 CISCO, supra note 89, at 2-3. 
 182 CISCO 2010-2015, supra note 149, at 2. 
 183 See Ford, supra note 13, at 3. 
 184 See, e.g., MONICA PAOLINI, SENZA FILI CONSULTING, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL CELLS 
AND WI-FI OFFLOAD 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.senzafiliconsulting.com/Portals/0/docs/Reports/SenzaFili_SmallCellWiFiTCO.p
df (noting that small cells and Wi-Fi can allow mobile operators to reduce total cost of own-
ership by 50%). 
 185 See SHUO DENG ET AL., WIFI, LTE, OR BOTH?: MEASURING MULTI-HOMED WIRELESS 
INTERNET PERFORMANCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASURE-
MENT 181 (2014) (noting that WiFi outperforms LTE 40% of the time for mobile data trans-
fers of various sizes). 
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b. Compression/Network Management Technology Improvements 
Wireless compression technology has improved dramatically since the in-
ception of the industry.186  For example, LTE is approximately forty times as 
spectrally efficient as early second-generation (2G) wireless technology.187 The 
impact of this compression has allowed carriers to increase the amount of traf-
fic (in conjunction with densification) that they can accommodate on a given 
amount of spectrum.188 Moreover, small cell deployments have significantly 
helped manage traffic in dense traffic areas.189 
c. Combined Impact of Offloading and other Technologies is Significant 
The combined impact of increased spectral efficiency, Wi-Fi offloading, 
network management, and densification are significant. A detailed technical 
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.190 However, consider 
an illustrative example of their combined implications on spectrum demand. 
Verizon’s LTE network, which carries approximately 20% of U.S. wireless 
network traffic,191 ran on only 22 MHz of spectrum (in the Upper 700 MHz C-
Block using two 10 MHz channels) until the end of 2013,192 while being gener-
ally considered one of the strongest U.S. networks, including in major metro 
areas.193 This would imply a total need of only 100 MHz to handle the coun-
                                                
 186 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 41. 
 187 See id. at Exhibit 4-F. 
 188 See id. at 135 (explaining that, despite growth in industry speed requirements, com-
pression and customer usage patterns may possibly slow growth in bandwidth needs). 
 189 See Kinney, supra note 84 (noting 10.2 million small cell units being used by 75 mo-
bile network operators; of these, only 17,000 deployments were in rural or otherwise remote 
areas). 
 190 For a more detailed analysis of spectrum and network efficiency improvements, see  
LS TELECOM AG & TMF ASSOC., MOBILE SPECTRUM REQUIREMENT ESTIMATES: GETTING 
THE INPUTS RIGHTS 33 (LS Telecom 2014), available at 
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 192 Farrar, supra note 129. 
 193 See RootMetrics Issues First-ever National RootScore® Report on Consumer Experi-
ence of Mobile Carrier Performance, PRWEB (Mar. 5, 2014), 
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Press Release, J.D. Power McGraw Hill Fin., Wireless Network Data Quality Performance 
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2014), available at http://www.jdpower.com/press-releases/2014-us-wireless-network-
quality-performance-study%E2%80%94volume-1 (noting that Verizon ranked highest in 
wireless network quality performance in all regions of the U.S.). 
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try’s traffic, well below the FCC’s 2010 projection that more than 524 MHz of 
spectrum would be needed to handle the same traffic.194 Other carriers also 
have large blocks of unused spectrum or spectrum that is reserved for older, 
less efficient technologies.195 Current LTE technology operates at a theoretical 
maximum downlink capacity of approximately 1.7 to 2.7 bits/Hz/cell, depend-
ing on antenna configuration.196 The next generation, LTE-Advanced, is ex-
pected to operate at between 2.4 and 3.7 bits/Hz/cell, which would represent a 
capacity increase of roughly 40% for similar devices, in addition to providing 
significant increases in uplink capacity.197 It is not clear that carriers will truly 
face spectrum exhaust once they properly refarm existing allocations to utilize 
the latest, most efficient transmission technologies. Moreover, while conserva-
tive policies regarding spectrum allocation for mobile broadband may create 
capacity shortages of services in periods of rapid demand growth,198 the great-
est shortages are likely to be in highly populated cities where terrestrial alter-
natives are most widely available.199 
B.  Economic and Psychological Explanations 
If pure methodological issues, technological changes, or business develop-
ments were the primary explanations for forecasting bias, one might expect 
that estimates would improve over time. The long history of inaccuracy and 
revision in demand estimates, including major recent revisions, suggest other 
underlying explanations.200 Moreover, if estimates were neutral, the number of 
projections that overestimate demand should be roughly equal to those that 
underestimate demand. This suggests a systematic tendency for overestima-
tion. At least two major categories of psychological factors can help explain 
why demand estimates tend to show directional skew: optimism bias and stra-
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tegic misrepresentation.201 Optimism bias is “a cognitive predisposition found 
with most people to judge future events in a more positive light than is war-
ranted by actual experience,” and represents a kind of forecasting blind spot.202 
Strategic misrepresentation is much more likely in cases where “where politi-
cal and organizational pressures are high,” and forecasters stand to gain direct 
benefit from overestimates.203  It is difficult to think of a more politically 
charged forecasting issue than spectrum, given the strong statutory oversight of 
licenses and the large amount of revenue that spectrum auctions can generate. 
1. Structural Issues May Exacerbate Psychological Biases 
Spectrum policy faces structural issues that exacerbate psychological biases, 
oftentimes through subtle organizational dynamics and regulatory processes 
that unconsciously influence behavior. First, the analysts who create spectrum 
demand estimates are often wireless industry veterans, dependent on the indus-
try for their livelihoods.204 These estimates are often funded by companies with 
an interest in seeing greater amounts of spectrum allocated to wireless carriers, 
and who have preferences for a single large number absent of qualifiers or nu-
ance.205 Moreover, government officials often become dependent on corporate-
provided data.206 Even government-produced estimates are often outsourced to 
industry consultants with a client base that benefits from having more spectrum 
allocated to wireless broadband.207 Professionals who have worked in the in-
dustry also often staff government telecommunications regulatory agencies.208 
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These professionals may be subject to some of these same biases as those who 
currently work in the industry. 
Second, the most powerful industry players are MNOs, who benefit when 
there is more available spectrum because it allows them to spend less on infra-
structure.209 In contrast, groups favoring amateur or unlicensed allocation of 
spectrum are generally smaller and less established.210 As such, they face sig-
nificant organizational challenges in advocating for particular spectrum poli-
cies, many are not aware of the importance of spectrum to their interests, and 
they often have few resources to spend on advocacy.211 MNOs, on the other 
hand, spend heavily to influence government telecommunications regulatory 
bodies on spectrum issues, both through formal lobbying and through informal 
methods such as commissioning academic studies, funding think tanks, and 
conducting general public relations campaigns.212 Even when spectrum is real-
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located to new entrant wireless carriers, incumbent users are less likely to ar-
gue about whether the wireless carrier actually needs the spectrum.213 Rather, 
they are likely to argue their rights under their existing licenses.214  As a result, 
regulatory bodies typically do not receive balanced input from all affected par-
ties.215 In addition, equipment providers have incentives to assist the efforts of 
MNOs, since equipment companies typically develop new hardware to take 
advantage of reallocated spectrum.216 
Finally, most large companies want to look successful to their investors and 
to banks supplying them with capital. A need for more spectrum implies a rap-
idly growing and successful industry. For these reasons, it is often in the best 
interest of wireless veterans to be overly generous in their estimation tech-
niques and methodologies. 
2. Potential Countervailing Influences to Consider 
In addition to economic and psychological factors that can cause estimates 
to be inaccurate, there are also factors that can improve the accuracy of esti-
mates that would otherwise be inaccurate. Demand estimates can become self-
fulfilling if the industry organizes to prepare to them. If the wireless industry 
invests in capacity to handle a certain level of demand, then it faces little mar-
ginal cost for supplying that level of bandwidth, and it may then lower prices 
to minimize excess capacity from going to waste. We are likely seeing this 
trend today. Demand is lower than prior projections and unlimited data plans 
and aggressive data plan discounting are making a comeback with major carri-
ers.217 In this way, the process of measuring demand may, to an extent, shape 
that demand. 
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Countervailing influences and the tendency towards “self fulfillment” of 
projections are not dominant. Projections used by policy makers seem, on the 
whole, to exceed actual demand results, despite factors that may help shape 
demand to meet projections. Policymakers may have legitimate reasons for 
wishing to stimulate wireless demand, such as increasing overall social wel-
fare, but the appropriate manner to do this would be through transparent pro-
cesses, not through adoption of flawed demand projections to justify policy 
decisions. 
IV. METHODS TO MITIGATE BIAS 
The issue of biased estimates is common in many industries, such as trans-
portation and supply chain planning.218 Inaccurate traffic estimates are particu-
larly well documented in the area of government-funded transportation infra-
structure projects such as roads and rail.219 In many of these projects, costs are 
underestimated while benefits are overestimated.220 This may, in part, be due to 
the political nature of many transportation funding debates, a process not un-
like that seen in spectrum policy debates.221 In order to garner support for an 
infrastructure project, it is often necessary to illustrate dramatic beneficial re-
sults.222 At the same time, many of these projects have long timeframes for 
planning and buildout,223 delaying the process of comparing impacts against 
initial and interim predictions. By this time, the analysts who issued these re-
ports, or politicians that utilized them to advance a project, may be in other 
positions where they are unlikely to be affected by the inaccuracy.224 
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Attempts in other industries to mitigate similar issues suggest a path forward 
for spectrum policy as well.225 Planners have developed several tools and 
methods that help mitigate bias in estimates.226 One well-known example of an 
industry attempting to tackle biases in estimates and projections was when the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission brought enforcement action against 
ten Wall Street brokerage firms in 2002-2003.227 Regulators were concerned 
that Wall Street research analysts were producing overly optimistic estimates 
to curry favor with investment banking clients, and developed a set of rules 
that may benefit spectrum planners as well.228 
A. Improving Forecasting Processes 
The American Planning Association, based on the results of a 2005 study of 
inaccuracies of demand forecasts for public works projects, endorsed a new 
forecast method called “reference class forecasting.”229 Conventional forecast-
ing takes an insider’s perspective, relying on industry-specific knowledge and 
processes.230 The idea behind reference class forecasting is to take the “outside 
view” of the events being forecast based on the results of similar projects.231 In 
particular, reference class forecasting considers the distribution of the accuracy 
of prior projections from similar events.232  It then evaluates and “de-biases” 
the initial results of the subject by overlaying average error ranges found in the 
earlier reference projections.233  By these means, the method reduces optimism 
bias and reduces psychological, political, and organizational pressures.234 Ex-
perimental evidence has shown that this process produces better results than 
conventional methods.235 
Spectrum managers might also benefit from such a method. However, one 
challenge of using reference class forecasting in a rapidly changing industry, 
such as wireless communications, is that the factors underlying forecasting 
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errors can change over time.236 In one case it might be price changes by carri-
ers; in another, changes in the rate of Wi-Fi offloading; and in a third, miscal-
culations about the impact of new applications.237 As a result, the errors of the 
past might not be relevant for understanding the errors in the current subject 
forecasts. In addition, other than historical demand for telephony and wireline 
broadband, which developed in significantly different regulatory and techno-
logical environments, it is difficult to identify relevant reference classes for 
wireless broadband. 
Nonetheless, reference call forecasting might be useful in identifying poten-
tial psychological, political, and organizational biases in forecasts. At mini-
mum, considering historical errors alongside current forecasts can give users a 
better idea about the likely accuracy of forecasts.238 In the case of spectrum 
demand forecasts, this would mean including other, similar projections in 
analyses, especially those conducted by external parties.239 Analysts would be 
free to explain differences in their methodologies that might make their analy-
sis more accurate, but including this information would give users a much bet-
ter appreciation of the likely limits of the forecast they are reading. 
B. Increased Transparency 
Spectrum demand estimates also suffer from a lack of methodological trans-
parency. As noted above, industry associations and companies often do not 
disclose sources or methods for competitive reasons.240 Cisco, in addition, re-
moves from easy access prior estimates when it releases new versions of its 
VNI report.241 This hinders people from evaluating the accuracy of projections 
in the prior report and considering them in the context of and against changes 
in methodology in the current report. Moreover, Cisco, like Worldcom, is 
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uniquely positioned within its industry and may be able to lend additional cred-
ibility to its reports by maintaining their proprietary nature.242 
Other industries use historical “batting averages” to evaluate the claims of 
forecasters.243  One example, as mentioned above, is 2002-2003 government-
led reforms in the financial sector when regulators became concerned that Wall 
Street research analysts were publishing biased research that inflated company 
prospects.244 In particular, regulators found that Wall Street research analysts at 
brokerage firms had inflated the prospects of the companies they followed.245 
This put investors at risk.246 Part of the resulting global settlement the major 
brokerage firms entered into with the government was to require each research 
report to contain a graphic of the history of the firm’s recommendations for 
that company’s stock.247 In this way, investors could evaluate the recommenda-
tion in context with the analyst’s “track record.”248 
It is difficult to measure whether or not the inclusion of a prior forecasts’ 
track record helps improve accuracy of forecasts. However, it provides the user 
with some context about the historical reliability of the projections.249  Such 
information should not be difficult for a spectrum analyst to provide and could 
be helpful to policy users of the information. 
C. Accountability 
Another method for improving reliability of data (as well as to address a 
multitude of other issues) is to make specific individuals accountable for the 
accuracy of their reports.  In the case of spectrum demand projections, they are 
often published without individual author names, so that a reader has little idea 
who conducted the analysis or signed off on results.250 Thus an analyst has little 
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fear of being “caught” or called out if their projections are widely off the 
mark.251 
Standard procedure in many areas of finance is to require analysts to sign 
reports indicating that their contents reflect the analyst’s views.252 Some ana-
lysts are also required to attest that they met various standards of independence 
and followed certain professional standards in developing estimates.253 Analyst 
accountability does not guarantee accuracy.254  However, without accountabil-
ity, as is currently the standard with spectrum demand forecasts, the odds for 
negligence or abuse increase. 
D. Avoid Conflicts of Interest 
Many industries have processes and procedures for avoiding conflicts of in-
terest.255 The separation of the business and journalism sides of newspaper or-
ganizations,256 and the tenure system for academics257 are probably among the 
best-known examples of attempting to assure independence from conflicts of 
interest within an organization. Similarly, the government’s settlement with 
Wall Street brokerage firms in 2003 limited the ability of firms to pay analysts 
based on investment banking revenue.258  However, it can be difficult to ensure 
the independence of analysts when a firm’s business is so deeply involved in 
specific, esoteric industry issues.259 A firms’ likely response, even if this could 
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be effectively done, would be to only hire analysts whose views tend towards 
the far end of the range that supports their goals. 
Even before the Wall Street brokerage settlement, analysts covering broker-
age stocks did not make recommendations on their own firm’s stock.260 This 
was seen an insurmountable conflict of interest.261 The best way of insulating 
from conflicts of interest is to ensure they arise outside of self-interested 
firms.262  Thus, projections from independent research firms are likely to be 
less susceptible to bias,263 and governments should rely primarily on such esti-
mates in developing national spectrum policy. As FCC Commissioner Copps 
said regarding using Internet traffic growth estimates from regulated carriers, 
“We must commit to doing the hard work of collecting our own data rather 
than relying on potentially misleading and harmful financial, accounting, and 
market information produced by corporate sources subject to clear biases and 
market pressures.”264 
V. POLICY ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Reducing the Need to Use Unreliable Projections 
In addition to more general process changes to mitigate bias, several altera-
tions to how spectrum policy itself is conducted may reduce the need to rely on 
demand projections. In particular, in the face of rapidly evolving wireless tech-
nology and uncertain, unreliable estimates, spectrum regulators should maxim-
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ize flexibility to adjust rules and uses, to ensure timely and proportional ad-
justments to allocations in the face of novel developments.265 
First, since wireless clearings are so expensive and time-consuming, there is 
strong pressure to begin reallocation procedures as soon as possible.266 Howev-
er, demand also changes rapidly, so regulators should build into spectrum poli-
cy a regular and periodic process for re-evaluating spectrum inventory and 
needs. This would involve closely examining trends in network technology, 
infrastructure deployments, and auction revenue to re-estimate the need and 
utility of additional clearing, rather than automatically assuming unlimited 
growth in demand. 
Second, there is significant uncertainty about future application growth and 
traffic management. In particular, there is no consensus about how many appli-
cations will truly require the extremely high quality of service of licensed spec-
trum;267 in real-world measurements, Wi-Fi continues to offer superior speeds 
over 3G and 4G wireless, and is more easily able to support key uses such as 
high-definition video streaming.268 In the face of this uncertainty, regulators 
should take a default position of favoring shared spectrum bands—including 
unlicensed bands—requiring minimal incumbent relocation. Unlicensed bands, 
for instance, make licensed spectrum more valuable (offloading peak demand 
being just one example), facilitate diversity of applications, lower barriers to 
entry, and provide the government consistent long-term revenue (from unli-
censed device and service innovation and sales tax) over the one-time proceeds 
provided by an auction.269 Regulators have taken note of these factors. In its 
2012 spectrum report, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (“PCAST”) argued that spectrum sharing is the best (and in many 
cases, the only viable) method to allow greater overall utilization of federal 
spectrum.270 The U.S. government currently has more than 1500 MHz of spec-
trum under investigation for repurposing, with a heavy emphasis on commer-
                                                
 265 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 11, at 7, 
21, 26, 32-33 (suggesting the Commission’s need to promote spectrum allocation flexibil-
ity). 
 266 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 3, at 79 (noting that historically it has taken 
6 to 13 years to reallocate spectrum, from first step to availability for use). 
 267 See Michael J. Marcus, Spectrum Policy for Radio Spectrum Access, 100 PROC. OF 
THE IEEE 1685, 1689-90 (2012) (noting that the “most rapidly growing sector of wireless 
use is not voice telephony with its strict latency requirements and constant throughput, but 
asymmetric data flows with widely varying rates”). 
 268 See U.S. Wi-Fi Report, OPENSIGNAL (July 2014), 
http://opensignal.com/reports/2014/us-wifi/ (comparing download speeds of Wi-Fi vs. 3G 
and 4G). 
 269 See Werbach & Mehta, supra note 59 (detailing the benefits of shared spectrum). 
 270 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 75, at vi-vii. 
344 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 23 
cial-federal sharing, including some bands featuring unlicensed or general ac-
cess usage rules.271 
Third, regulators should immediately begin imposing stronger and more ro-
bust receiver standards on wireless devices, including more capable antennas 
and strong interference acceptance standards. This reduces interference issues 
that complicate repurposing of bands by minimizing the likelihood that adja-
cent users will be harmed by new types or patterns of interference.272 Embed-
ding advanced computational capacity into receivers would also facilitate sub-
sequent changes to spectrum allocations, since wider-range antennas with ad-
vanced sensing and software capabilities can more easily share frequencies or 
relocate to adjacent bands.273 
Fourth, to avoid the risks of spectrum allocation rules being overturned for 
being arbitrary and capricious, regulators are required to engage in “substantial 
inquiry” during rule-making processes.274 The “presumption of regularity” can-
not be used to prevent a “thorough, probing, in-depth review.”275 It is not clear 
whether basing a rulemaking on estimates that have proven inaccurate and 
have not been updated, meets this standard.276 Continuing reliance on such 
forecasts raises particular concerns due to the financial impact of spectrum 
allocation decisions.277 Moreover, agencies are required to justify their rule-
making.278 It is not clear that a justification based on such unreliable projections 
would be a sufficient agency defense, even under the Chevron standard of 
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agency deference.279  Even if rules based on unreliable forecasts withstand 
challenges, they risk undermining the perceived credibility of agencies using 
them. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Over time, government agencies may reduce their need for demand projec-
tions by facilitating more flexibility in spectrum bands. Currently, though, pol-
icymakers have little choice but to rely on some sort of projections of spectrum 
demand. Moreover, regardless of the exact demand, mobile broadband is grow-
ing, and political pressure to allocate more spectrum to MNOs is overwhelm-
ing. This reliance on projections is unlikely to completely disappear. Spectrum 
is limited and in high demand, so it must be allocated; this requires empirical 
input. 
Government agencies, however, have a strong obligation to manage spec-
trum as efficiently as possible due to its finite, limited nature and public own-
ership. It is not just reasonable, but should be standard practice, for policymak-
ers to use the best projections possible, to insist on high standards from those 
whose estimates they use, and to properly incorporate uncertainty and risk into 
their policy decisions. The current system falls far short of that goal, in our 
view.  To the extent policymakers do not have confidence in projections, they 
should be more up-front about potential biases and errors and periodically re-
assess their decisions. This, in turn, requires governments to take measures to 
improve the quality of the forecasts they commission. Requiring outside ex-
perts to be transparent about data and method, to use and publish sensitivity 
analyses, to identify potential sources of error, to minimize conflicts of inter-
est, and to avoid establishing a single projection as “fact” when it is known to 
be subject to uncertainty, are minimum first steps. 
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